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- Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve
- Corruption, governance and tax revenues in Africa
- The Effect of Corruption and Governance on Tax Revenues
Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve
Increasing domestic revenue mobilization remains a challenge for many governments, particularly in low-income countries. Using a sample of East African countries, the study sets off to investigate the impact of financial development from a multi-dimensional perspective on tax revenues for the period to , and how political development and the control of corruption would enhance the observed nexus. The dynamic panel results from the system GMM estimation approach indicate a significant role of financial development overall and the financial institutions and financial markets in particular.
A disaggregation of the duo suggests that it is the depth of financial institutions that greatly matters for tax revenue, with a one per cent change expected to yield about 0. It is then followed by their level of accessibility, financial market depth and efficiency. We fail to find significant evidence in support of financial market access and financial institutions efficiency although the possibility for the latter seems indismissible.
Further evidence points to the catalytic nature of a good institutional and political environment in pursuit of higher tax-GDP ratio via financial development.
Policies to promote the depth and accessibility of financial institutions as well the depth and efficiency of financial markets in East Africa alongside well-focused anti-corruption programs and democratic governance are likely to yield better fiscal outcomes in terms of domestic tax revenues critically needed to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. We also confirm the positive role played by the lagged tax revenue, per capita GDP, trade openness, debt-to-GDP ratio and population density in the tax effort.
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Corruption, governance and tax revenues in Africa
Agbeyegbe, Terence D. Terence D. Ratbek Dzhumashev, Djumashev, R, Patrick A. Jacobs,
Formulaire de demande de DAI. We designed a public good laboratory experiment in order to identify the causal relationships between tax evasion and corruption and query whether deterring one of these behaviours may have desirable spillover effects on the other. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that i the possibility of embezzling tax revenue increases the likelihood and amount of tax evaded; ii fighting corruption has a significant negative impact on tax evasion, suggesting a crossover effect of deterrence from anti-corruption to anti-tax evasion; iii penalizing tax evasion does not have a significant impact on embezzlement; indicating that the crossover effect is unidirectional. Interestingly, all three deterrence treatments increase public good provision compared to the baseline treatment, but with a clear ranking: the Big bang approach is the most effective, followed by Anti-corruption, then Anti-evasion. Aller au contenu principal. Abstract We designed a public good laboratory experiment in order to identify the causal relationships between tax evasion and corruption and query whether deterring one of these behaviours may have desirable spillover effects on the other.
In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators. It is shown that in somecircumstances, this may bring about Laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue, i. Further, a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues. Finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration, these outcomes become more likely. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Rent this article via DeepDyve.
The total amount of government revenue decreases as corruption reduces tax revenues if it contributes to tax evasion, improper tax exemptions or weak tax.
The Effect of Corruption and Governance on Tax Revenues
Download this publication. Over the past two decades many developing countries have implemented comprehensive reforms of their tax administrations in order to increase revenue and curb corruption. It argues that the technocratic remedies supported by donors have underplayed the degree to which progress in tax administration depends upon a thorough "cultural change" in the public service. The motives of individual actors are often inextricably tied to the interests of the social groups to which they belong. In the URA, patronage runs through networks grounded on ties of kinship and community origin.
- О, Дэвид… как они могли… Фонтейн растерялся: - Вы знаете этого человека. Сьюзан застыла в полутора метрах от экрана, ошеломленная увиденным, и все называла имя человека, которого любила. ГЛАВА 115 В голове Дэвида Беккера была бесконечная пустота. Я умер. Но я слышу какие-то звуки.
- Она невинно захлопала ресницами. - Я имела в виду Кармен. - Это имя она произнесла с нарочитым пуэрто-риканским акцентом. - Кого? - спросил он чуть осипшим голосом. - Кармен.
И все переформатирую. - Нет! - жестко парировал Стратмор. - Не делай .