File Name: attacker deterrence and perceived risk in a stackelberg security game .zip
- Terrorism risk and optimal policy response: theory and empirics
- Decision and Game Theory for Security
- Intelligent adversary risk analysis: a bioterrorism risk management model.
Terrorism risk and optimal policy response: theory and empirics
Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composed of cyber, physical and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple layers and units of modern control systems require an integrated framework to address cross-layer design issues related to security and resilience challenges. To this end, game theory provides a bottom-up modeling paradigm to capture the strategic interactions among multiple components of the complex system and enables a holistic view to understand and design cyber-physical-human control systems. In this review, we first provide a multi-layer perspective toward increasingly complex and integrated control systems and then introduce several variants of dynamic games for modeling different layers of control systems. We present game-theoretic methods for understanding the fundamental tradeoffs of robustness, security and resilience and developing a cross-layer approach to enhance the system performance in various adversarial environments. This review also includes three quintessential research problems that represent three research directions where dynamic game approaches can bridge between multiple research areas and make significant contributions to the design of modern control systems.
Decision and Game Theory for Security
The proliferation of terrorism worldwide raises the risk that terrorist strategies could evolve from conventional methods e. The authors make three contributions toward a better understanding of this risk and how it responds to counterterrorism measures. The authors find that in equilibrium, CBRN attacks, though less likely and more difficult to execute, are more deadly. In the end, the trade-off between, on one hand, the greater difficulty of carrying out a CBRN attack, and on the other, the greater deadliness of such an attack, points to a level of optimal counterterrorism spending by governments that weighs toward defending against CBRN attacks. The authors discuss these results and compare them with the actual level of counterterrorism spending by the US Government. The framework of the game allows for substitution between the conventional and CBRN weapon types. These aspects of this paper, together with the unique calibration methodology, and the use of some unique terrorism data for the first time, are what distinguish this work from similar game theoretic papers in this area.
We show how quantifiable deterrence effectiveness and resulting critical infrastructure risk change when we obfuscate notional Port Security Grant investment information from a prospective attacker, and we also explore whether these metrics change if we assume Prospect Theory is a more accurate explanation of decision making than classical Subjective Expected Utility Theory. Importantly, we do not advocate for policy changes but rather expand on a previously published methodology that might support such decisions in the future. Taquechel, Eric F. The goal of this article is to illustrate a process to support decisions on whether to publicize information about CIKR security investments intended to deter attacks, or whether to obfuscate those investments, by considering cognitive biases. Importantly, we are not advocating for publicizing or obfuscating details of federal grant investments in general. We simply offer a methodology to support such decisions.
Intelligent adversary risk analysis: a bioterrorism risk management model.
Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: In Stackelberg security games, a defender must allocate scarce resources to defend against a potential attacker.
Возвращайся домой. Прямо. - Встретимся в Стоун-Мэнор.
Сьюзан должна была признать, что прозвучало это довольно убедительно. У Танкадо не было причин подозревать, что код в Интернете не является оригиналом. Никто не имел к нему доступа, кроме него самого и Северной Дакоты. Если бы Танкадо не вернулся к анализу программы после ее выпуска свет, он ничего бы не узнал про этот черный ход. Но он так долго трудился над Цифровой крепостью, что вряд ли ему захотелось бы к ней возвращаться.